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THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT: SOME
COMMENTS ON THE LATEST DRAFT OF RUPA
J. DENNIs HYNES*
I. INTRODUCTION
0 n June 7, 1991, the Drafting Committee to Revise the Uniform
Partnership Act, appointed by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), promulgated its
latest draft (the Draft) of the proposed Revised Uniform Partnership
Act (RUPA).1 The first part of the Draft was given a second and final2
reading at the 1991 conference of NCCUSL.3 The plans of the Com-
mittee apparently are to complete the second reading of the Draft at
the 1992 annual conference of NCCUSL, 4 which, followed by a vote
of approval, would conclude the work of NCCUSL and make the
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law; B.A., 1958; LL.B., 1960,
University of Colorado. I wish to thank Professor Cliff Calhoun for his thoughtful comments
on a draft of this Article. I also wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance of my research
assistants, Flint Ogle and Robert Phillips.
1. Utnuoam PARTmNasuP ACT (Draft for Partial Approval June 7, 1991) [hereinafter
Draft]. The draft is typewritten and is available by writing NCCUSL at 676 North St. Clair St.,
Suite 1700, Chicago, IL 60611, or by calling (312) 915-0195. Payment of $7.90 is required. The
draft is entitled DRAFT FOR PARTIAL APPROVAL and indicates on its cover page that it
was prepared for the 100th meeting of NCCUSL, which was held on August 2-9, 1991. It con-
tains renumbered sections but has no table coordinating the renumbered sections with the section
numbers under the Uniform Partnership Act. (An earlier draft dated 1/19/91 did produce a
table that related the section numbers of prior drafts, which corresponded to the section num-
bers of the Uniform Partnership Act, to the renumbered sections of RUPA.) The source of a
section in UPA will be identified whenever it will be helpful to do so. Because the Draft is not
widely available, citations to it will include quotation of the material being cited.
2. The NCCUSL gives its proposed uniform acts two readings. An act is promulgated as a
uniform act after a second reading is completed and a vote of approval taken by the Conference
acting as a committee of the whole. See NCCUSL Const. art. 8, § 8.1, reprinted in HANDBOOK
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF Co .ISSIONEPS ON UNIFoRM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF
THE AN NuAL CONFERENCE MnNE G IN ITs Nnmir-Furm YER 469-70 (1990).
3. The second reading was completed through § 303 of the Draft. Telephone Interview
with Dean Donald Weidner, Reporter, Drafting Committee to Revise Uniform Partnership Act
(August 12, 1991) (Weidner is Dean of the Florida State University College of Law).
4. The plans initially were to finalize RUPA in the summer of 1991. Donald J. Weidner,
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Midstream: Major Policy Decisions, 21 U. TOL. L. Rv.
825, 826 (1990) [hereinafter Midstream]. That goal was not reached, but in August of 1989 a
draft of RUPA was presented to the Conference, and the first of the two required readings was
begun. The first reading was completed at the annual meeting in 1990. Donald J. Weidner,
Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAW. 427 (1991)
[hereinafter Revision].
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revised Act available as a uniform Act to the fifty states for legislative
adoption.5
The Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), promulgated by NCCUSL in
1914, has been adopted in forty-nine states.6 Very few amendments
have been made to it by the adopting states, and most of the amend-
ments are minor.7 UPA is highly conceptual, tightly drafted, and con-
cise. 8 Litigation over three-quarters of a century has given lawyers a
sense of security in at least some areas of the Act, an overall impres-
sion of how courts approach this form of doing business, and a sense
of the type of problems likely to arise. Thus, this seventy-five-year-old
Act has worked remarkably well. It has stood the test of time.
This does not mean that UPA is perfect. As a report of a subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Busi-
ness Organizations of the American Bar Association noted,
constructive revisions can be made.9 But final steps to change it
should be taken only after full opportunity is given for evaluation of
the changes by members at large of the profession, thus increasing the
possibilities that RUPA will be widely accepted and that the law of
partnership will remain truly uniform. 0
5. Changes doubtless will be made in the Draft before formal adoption by NCCUSL as a
uniform act. But the June 7 draft is the latest draft available to the author and thus is the focus
of this Article.
6. Louisiana is the only state that has not adopted the Uniform Partnership Act. See UM-
FoRM PAmzTEasmp ACT, 6 U.L.A. 1-2 (Master ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991) (Table), listing the adopt-
ing states [hereinafter UPA].
7. The one exception to this is the state of Georgia, which adopted UPA in 1984 with
extensive amendments.
8. UPA was redrafted numerous times over a period of twelve years before approval by
NCCUSL. William D. Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YAm L.J. 617, 620 (1915). This
extraordinary amount of deliberation and care doubtless contributed to the high quality of the
Act.
9. See UPA Revision Subcommittee of the Committee on Partnerships and Unincorpor-
ated Business Organizations of the American Bar Association, Should the Uniform Partnership
Act Be Revised?, 43 Bus. LAw. 121 (1987) [hereinafter ABA Report], where a long list of sug-
gested changes to UPA is published. Although the report was not submitted to the ABA for
approval, it was submitted to NCCUSL and apparently served as the inspiration to NCCUSL to
undertake in August 1986 a complete revision of UPA. Id. at 121, editor's note.
10. Most legislation proposed today by NCCUSL more appropriately can be characterized
as model rather than uniform in nature, even though described as uniform by NCCUSL, due to
the modem tendency of states to tinker with whatever is proposed to them. A dramatic recent
illustration of this is the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1976) and its 1985 Amend-
ments, which have been extensively altered in a large number of adopting states. See REvisED
UNuoRm LnuarD PmTNERsmsp ACT (1976) with 1985 Amendments, 6 U.L A. 244-70 and exten-
sive notes on Action in Adopting Jurisdictions after every section of the Act (Master ed. Supp.
1991). This may in part be the result of uniform legislation being prepared and proposed without
provision in a structured way for public exposure and comment. To await public exposure and
comment until after approval by the conference, with debate taking place only before state bar
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This Article urges the Reporter and his Committee to publish an
exposure draft11 of the proposed revised Act,12 then wait for a reason-
able period of time13 before seeking final approval by the conference
of NCCUSL. Time should be made available for articles on the Act to
be written and published and themselves criticized.1 4 Perhaps weak-
nesses currently unthought of would be identified, and solutions to
areas admittedly causing difficulty15 may be proposed.
The drafting committee for UPA went through eight drafts over a
period of twelve years before presentation of the Act to the Confer-
ence of Commissioners for adoption in 1914.16 The committee to re-
vise UPA has been in existence for only four years,'17 and its first
association committees and legislatures, defeats the goal of uniformity. Of course, uniform acts
will vary in that regard, but the law of partnership has a long and successful history of unifor-
mity, which encourages widespread comment before promulgation as a uniform act.
11. There is precedent for publication of an exposure draft in a journal of wide circulation.
See, e.g., Exposure Draft, Third-Party Opinion Report of the Section of Business Law, Ameri-
can Bar Association, 46 Bus. LAw. No. SI, 1-38 (Dec. 31, 1990). The Exposure Draft stated on
its cover sheet that it was "being circulated to provide interested persons the opportunity to
review and comment upon the current work product." Id. at 1. A similar process for RUPA
would be highly desirable. Although the Draft was published in the 1991 supplement of ALAN R.
BROMBERG & LAmY '. RisTmN, BROMBERO AND RrsSTEiN ON PATrmEsHin (1988) [hereinafter
BROMBERO & RiasTmi], this is not the equivalent of the publication of an exposure draft inviting
comment on the current work product.
12. Perhaps the June 7, 1991, Draft would suffice as an exposure draft. It contains the new
section numbers and a number of changes from the prior drafts. There apparently was substan-
tial discussion of the first several sections of the Draft at the 1991 annual Conference of
NCCUSL, however, and at least one more redraft is contemplated before the 1992 Conference.
13. See Gerald V. Niesar, Subcommittee Comments on Draft Partnership Act Revision, 11
Bus. LAw. UPDATE 5 (July/August 1991), stating that the Committee on Partnerships of the
ABA has established a subcommittee to comment on drafts of RUPA, and inviting comments
from interested members "concerning particular problems that lawyers have found operating
under the UPA. Suggested solutions would also be appreciated." This invitation was included in
a newsletter dated July/August 1991. Unless things are unseasonably rushed, it could take several
years for comments to be received, solutions evaluated, and revisions made and discussed.
14. Several articles already have been published, including three thoughtful, straightfor-
ward, and informative articles by the Reporter. See Donald J. Weidner, A Perspective to Recon-
sider Partnership Law, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. Rnv. 1 (1988) [hereinafter A Perspective]; Weidner,
Midstream, supra note 4; Weidner, Revision, supra note 4; see also Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr.,
Duty of Care: The Partnership Cases, 15 OKLA. Crry U. L. Ray. 753 (1990) (commenting on §
21 of an earlier draft of RUPA, now § 404 in the Draft); Larry E. Ribstein, A Mid-Term Assess-
ment of the Project to Revise the Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAw. 111 (1990). Another
article of importance in understanding RUPA is the ABA Report, supra note 9.
15. One area of obvious controversy among the parties drafting the revised Act is whether
the word "dissolution" should continue to be used in the revision. The Reporter strongly feels
that it should not be, yet his position was for the first time rejected in the preparation of the I/
19/91 draft. See Weidner, Midstream, supra note 4, at 859 ("My greatest disappointment is that
the word dissolution was put in RUPA's breakup rules at our most recent meeting. The term
dissolution is an unnecessary one that was not included in RUPA until the new breakup rules
were close to final form.").
16. Lewis, supra note 8, at 620.
17. Weidner, Midstream, supra note 4, at 826.
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drafts were promulgated only several years ago.18 This is only a frac-
tion of the time devoted to the original Act. In the absence of a com-
pelling need for haste,' 9 the Committee is urged to cast a glance
backward and draw inspiration with regard to timing from those who
did the original work on UPA. 20
This Article discusses three policy positions taken in the Draft. First,
involving creditors' rights, the position taken by the Draft is challenged
on substantive grounds. Second, involving the standards for expulsion
of partners, an amendment to the Draft is suggested, urging that the
drafting committee take the opportunity to write into statutory law the
relatively unambiguous and sensible standards developed by courts un-
der UPA when dealing with this situation. Third, some questions are
raised about the implications of the approach taken in the Draft to the
important issue of fiduciary responsibilities among partners.
Others may disagree with the substantive views advanced herein,
with the importance of the topics chosen, or with both. The point of
major concern is not that the particular views espoused here prevail,
but that others in the profession at large2' have a full opportunity to
express views about an exposure draft of RUPA before final consider-
ation by the conference of NCCUSL.
II. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUAL PARTNERS FOR DEBTS OF THE
PARTNERSHIP-A CHALLENGE TO THE REALLOCATION OF PIuOR=rS IN
THE DRAFT
The Draft states that partners are individually liable for the obliga-
tions of the partnership 22 despite the shift in RUPA from the aggre-
18. The first drafts, published in three parts, were dated July 14, 1988.
19. Unlike the situation involving the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA), there is
no apparent need to rush adoption of a revised Act. Considerable pressure existed to update
ULPA. ULPA was not designed for large-scale public limited partnerships intended to function
on a nationwide basis, a mode of investment in vogue at the time of revision of ULPA, and thus
was viewed as not responsive to an urgent need. The economic and political times in the 1970s
produced a groundswel of pressure to change ULPA, which was revised in the mid-1970s under
circumstances of undue haste. At that time tax rates were high, the inflation rate was accelerat-
ing, and the search in some circles for tax shelters was relentless. The decision to revise ULPA
was made and implemented in such haste that the 1976 revision was itself substantially revised
just nine years later. At first the 1985 revision was characterized as a new uniform Act, then it
was characterized as an amendment to the 1976 Act. This created confusion and the frustration
of having to move back and forth among several different acts on numerous occasions in order
to find the law on a single point. Surely it is desirable to take all reasonable steps to avoid a
similar situation with regard to UPA, particularly when there is no pressure for haste.
20. Of course, the situation is different with a revision than with the original drafting of an
act. The author is not recommending that twelve years be taken for this project, although no
harm is seen in that, but the point about the lack of need for haste still stands.
21. It is noteworthy that all of the articles written to date on RUPA have been authored by
members of, or official advisors to, the Drafting Committee of NCCUSL, or members of the
ABA Subcommittee on RUPA.
22. See Draft, supra note 1, § 306, entitled PARTNER'S LIABILITY, and stating: "All
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gate theory23 to the entity theory24 of partnership. The liability of each
partner is characterized in the Draft as joint and several in nature,2S
wisely rejecting the overly fine line drawn in UPA between liability of
partners for contractual obligations of the partnership (joint in na-
ture) and liability for tortious claims against the firm (joint and sev-
eral).2 6 Section 307(c) of the Draft states, however, that creditors of a
partnership who seek payment of the amounts due and owing to them
must first exhaust all partnership assets before asserting rights to the
individual assets of partners.2' This converts partners to a status
merely of guarantors of collection in the ordinary case. 28 This is curl-
partners are liable jointly and severally for all debts and obligations of the partnership, unless
otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law."
23. The aggregate theory conceptualizes a partnership as an aggregate of the persons who
are its partners doing business in joint ownership form. The partnership itself has no separate
existence. Thus, if A, B, and C are the partners in the ABC partnership and A leaves or D joins
the partnership, the aggregate changes and the original partnership dissolves. A different part-
nership carries on the business.
24. The entity theory conceptualizes a partnership as an entity separate from its partners.
Thus, the partnership does not necessarily dissolve upon a change in its members.
25. See supra note 22.
26. UNORM PARTNmump ACT, § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (Master ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991).
27. See Draft, supra note 1, § 307(c), stating:
Except as provided in subsection (d), a judgment creditor of a partner may not levy
execution against the assets of the partner to collect a judgment based on a claim that
could have been successfully asserted against the partnership unless:
(1) a judgment based on the same claim has been obtained against the partnership;
and
(2) a writ of execution against the partnership on the judgment against it has been
returned unsatisfied in whole or in part.
Subsection (d) of § 307 reads as follows:
(d) A claimant may proceed directly against the assets of a partner without first ob-
taining a judgment against the partnership if:
(1) an involuntary case under Title 11 of the United States Code has been com-
menced against the partnership and has not been dismissed within 60 days after com-
mencement, or the partnership has commenced a voluntary case under Title 11 of the
United States Code and the case has not been dismissed;
(2) the claimant and the partner have agreed that the claimant need not exhaust
partnership assets;
(3) the court grants permission to the claimant to proceed against the assets of a
partner based on a finding that the partnership assets subject to execution within this
State are clearly insufficient to satisfy the judgment, that exhaustion of partnership
assets is excessively burdensome, or that the grant of permission is an appropriate
exercise of the court's inherent equitable powers; or
(4) liability is imposed on the partner by law or contract independent of the exis-
tence of the partnership.
Draft, supra note 1, at § 307.
28. Subsection (d) of § 307, supra note 27, qualifies the prohibition against proceeding di-
rectly against a partner's assets under certain circumstances and thus takes into account the ex-
traordinary case. The qualifications are either quite narrow, however, addressing bankruptcy or
separate agreement between partner and creditor, or are vague, involving standards like "clearly
insufficient" or "excessively burdensome" or "an appropriate exercise of the court's inherent
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ous, because the language of joint and several liability suggests a pri-
mary liability. 29
This is an area of the law in which clarification is needed. UPA
contains no language on it. State courts are divided on how to deal
with this matter. One line of authority allows creditors to have, at
their option, immediate access to the assets of individual partners. 30 A
conflicting line of authority denies this and requires creditors to first
exhaust claims against partnership assets. 31 It is not easy to identify a
majority rule.3 2
Several cases distinguish between claims creating joint liability,
where some courts require exhaustion of partnership assets,3 3 and
equitable powers." The Comments to § 307 do not discuss these standards, nor are any examples
provided of the standards in operation. Draft, supra note 1, at 43-48.
29. See Horn's Crane Serv. v. Prior, 152 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb. 1967) (Smith, J., dissent-
ing) (noting in related circumstances that, "[t]he provision for joint liability of members to part-
nership creditors strongly suggests a primary liability"). This suggestion of primary liability is
even stronger in the case of joint and several liability, certainly in the eyes of the courts which
draw the distinction addressed in the text accompanying note 34, infra.
30. See Catalina Mortgage Co. v. Monier, 800 P.2d 574, 578 (Ariz. 1990) ("[A] partner
may be sued severally and his assets reached even though the partnership or other partners are
not sued and their assets not applied to the debt."); Head v. Henry Tyler Const. Corp., 539 So.
2d 196, 199 (Ala. 1988) ("[I]f a creditor chooses to bring an action against one of the partners,
that partner is liable for all of the partnership debts, regardless of whether the creditor first
attempted to recover the debt from the partnership or prove that the partnership had no as-
sets."); Smith v. Wohi, 702 S.W.2d 905, 910-11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) ("A plaintiff has the
option to sue any individual partner; and... may hold that partner liable for the entire debt of
the partnership. Further, a partner who has paid more than his share... has the right to seek
reimbursement from his co-partners."); In re Kelsey, 6 B.R. 114, 118 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (The
court found that under Texas law "[c]reditors [have the right] to select any individual of the firm
and collect their claims wholly from his individual property.") (alteration in original).
31. See, e.g., Horn's Crane Serv., 152 N.W.2d at 423, where the majority in a divided
opinion stated that, "[i]n an action seeking a personal judgment against the individual members
of a partnership... the petition does not state a cause of action if it fails to state that there is
no partnership property or that it is insufficient to satisfy the debts of the partnership." Accord
Matter of Fowler, 407 F. Supp. 799 (W.D. Okla. 1975); Wisnouse v. Telsey, 367 F. Supp. 855
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (summarizing New York law, which has a series of cases asserting this proposi-
tion); Lenkin v. Beckman, 575 A.2d 273 (D.C. 1990); McCune & McCune v. Mountain Bell Tel.,
758 P.2d 914, 917 (Utah 1988) ("If a debt is contractual in origin, common law requires that the
partnership's assets be resorted to and exhausted before partnership creditors can reach the part-
ners' individual assets."); Commonwealth Capital Inv. Corp. v. McElmurry, 302 N.W.2d 222
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
32. The secondary authority is as divided as the cases on this issue. ALAN R. BROM3ERG &
JUDsON E. CRAN, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNESSmP § 58, at 342 (1968) [hereinafter
CRAN & BRommERG], states that, "[t]he generally prevailing common law rule is that the part-
nership creditor having obtained a judgment may at his option proceed against joint or separate
property or both simultaneously in his efforts to collect by means of execution." Accord HAR-
OLD G. REuscmiixm & WiuiAm A. GREGoRy, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERsm'p § 207, at
317 (2d ed. 1990). In contrast, Bromberg & Ribstein, supra note 11, at 1:28 states that, "[t]he
plaintiff often cannot proceed against the partners until exhausting remedies against the partner-
ship." No authority is cited for this statement.
33. See McCune & McCune, 758 P.2d at 917; Cunard Line Ltd. v. Abney, 540 F. Supp. 657
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
R UPA
claims creating joint and several liability, where some courts allow im-
mediate suit against individual partners. 34 A number of the cases that
allow immediate suit against individual partners have arisen in states
that have amended paragraph fifteen of UPA to declare all liability to
be joint and several.35
At first glance, the above distinction seems sensible. Joint and sev-
eral liability by definition anticipates the possibility of just one person
being sued singly and held liable for the entire obligation.36 Joint lia-
bility, on the other hand, historically has mandated the dismissal of a
suit on a joint obligation if a creditor has not joined all joint obligors
or does not have a valid excuse for the absence of those not joined. 7
This would lead naturally to the assumption that because joint obli-
gors must be joined in a suit, the joint assets of the joint obligors
must first be exhausted before personal assets are pursued. If the lia-
bility is joint and several, no such steps need be taken.38 Those deci-
sions that deny immediate access to the assets of individual partners
appear to do so, not on the policy that this reflects the usual under-
standing of creditors, but rather on the assumption that the law of
joint obligations so requires. This assumption is false.
The difference between joint liability and joint and several liability
is procedural only. No lines are drawn concerning pursuit of assets.39
If all joint obligors are properly joined and a judgment is rendered,
there is no requirement that a creditor must first exhaust whatever
joint assets happen to exist.40 Instead, the creditor can proceed directly
34. SeeHead, 539 So. 2d at 199:
The major impact of making partners not merely jointly liable but also severally liable
is that if a creditor chooses to bring an action against one of the partners, that partner
is liable for all of the partnership debts, regardless of whether the creditor first at-
tempted to recover the debt from the partnership or prove that the partnership had no
assets.
See generally Catalina Mortgage, 800 P.2d 574; Smith v. Wohl, 702 S.W.2d 905 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985).
35. Several states have amended their statutes to make all partnership liability joint and
several. 6 U.L.A. 174 (Master ed. 1969 & Supp. 1991). It is a matter of some irony that the Draft
follows this lead and declares all liability joint and several in nature, yet it expressly reverses the
rule of immediate suit against partners that exists in many of those states that already have
amended their partnership acts to declare all liability joint and several.
36. FLENING JAMs, JR. & GEoFREY C. HAzARD, JR., CIvIL PROCEDURE 469 (3d ed. 1985).
Contribution or indemnity rights among persons jointly and severally liable for an obligation are
a separate issue from that of several liability.
37. CRANE & BROMBERO, supra note 32, at 335.
38. See JAMEs & HAzARD, supra note 36.
39. See In re Kelsey, 6 B. R. 114, 118 (1980) (where the court states, "[t]hat the debtor, as
the general partner, is jointly and severally liable is not a complete answer because it does not
determine whether creditors of the partnership must first exhaust partnership assets before they
can collect from the debtor").
40. See 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTs § 327 (Walter H. E.
1991]
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against whatever joint obligor the creditor wishes, because each joint
obligor is fully liable for the underlying obligation.4
As mentioned above, this is an area of the law that needed clarifica-
tion. The Draft provides clarification in section 307(c), taking the ap-
proach suggested in the ABA Report that requires creditors to exhaust
partnership assets before proceeding against individual partners.42 Sec-
tion 307(d)(2) acknowledges that creditors and partners can agree oth-
erwise, in language that seems to contemplate a specific agreement
between creditor and partner.43
The position taken in the Draft, though clear, is undesirable. It is
not an inexorable result of shifting to the entity model because the
Draft departed from the entity theory in section 306 when it mandated
personal liability of the partners for the obligations of the partner-
ship. 44 The main policy underlying section 307(c) appears to be that of
Jaeger, ed., 3d ed. 1959); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRAcTs § 289 (1981). The state of New
York appears to be an exception. There it was early established that joint assets had to be first
exhausted, apparently in all joint liability situations. See Seligman v. Friedlander, 92 N.E. 1047,
1048-49 (N.Y. 1910) ("The theory of the law was that the joint liabilities should be paid from the
joint property if possible, and not until that remedy was exhausted, or resort thereto shown to be
useless, could payment from the individual property be exacted."). It is a matter of interest that
several of the early New York cases first setting forth this rule involved claims by creditors
against the estate of a deceased partner. This is a situation where the sympathies of the court
may be engaged in the direction of requiring satisfaction from joint assets ahead of claims
against an estate. Indeed, at one time under the common law the death of a partner absolved
him, as a joint obligor, of all liability. CRANE & BRommRO, supra note 32, at 340, 454. Ulti-
mately equity stepped in to establish creditors' rights against the estate of the deceased partner if
the surviving copartners were insolvent. Id. Only a few states have followed New York in its rule
that joint assets first have to be exhausted before individual assets can be pursued. Id. at 341,
n.93. UPA expressly recognizes the liability of a deceased partner's estate in § 36(4) without,
however, addressing the problem of exhaustion of joint assets. § 36(4), 6 U.L.A. 436 (Master ed.
1985 & Supp. 1991).
41. The opinion in Cunard Line Ltd. v. Abney, 540 F. Supp. 657, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
well summarizes the law on this topic:
The joint nature of the obligation does not imply that the joint obligor is immune
from being sued individually (citation omitted). It only gives the joint obligor the right
to insist that the plaintiff join other such obligors if joinder be possible (citation omit-
ted). And, upon following a prescribed procedure .... a plaintiff may hold a joint
obligor personally liable on a joint obligation.
Contribution or indemnity rights among the joint obligors are a separate issue from that of joint
liability.
42. See ABA Report, supra note 9, at 143.
43. See Draft, supra note 1, at § 307(d)(2), stating that a claimant may proceed directly
against the assets of a partner without first obtaining a judgment against the partnership if "the
claimant and the partner have agreed that the claimant need not exhaust partnership assets."
44. Indeed, it would be quixotic to point to the entity theory for justification of the decision
to convert partners to the status of guarantors for collection, once the decision to hold partners
personally liable for obligations of the partnership has been made. The Reporter himself states in
a different context that:
I enthusiastically support RUPA's move closer to an entity theory, but do not believe
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reflecting modem expectations; i.e., it is assumed that today most
creditors expect to recover against the assets of the partnership and
not against the individual partners unless the assets are insufficient. 45
Surprisingly, there is little discussion in court opinions46 or the aca-
the theory should shortcircuit policy analysis. There is no reason why the logic of the
entity theory should be any more ineluctably applied in the partnership area than in
the corporate area, and the entity theory of corporations is often set aside to reach the
right result.
Weidner, Midstream, supra note 4, at 832.
However, adoption of the entity theory is given as an explanation in the ABA report for its
assertion that partners should be in the position of guarantors of collection only. ABA Report,
supra note 9, at 143 ("This rule would respect the concept of the partnership as an entity."). The
ABA Report appears to have strongly influenced the drafters of RUPA. The explanation con-
tained in the Comment to § 307 is couched in part in entity terms, quoting from the ABA Re-
port. Draft, supra note 1, at 43-48. Nevertheless, the entity theory does not seem to be the
primary moving factor behind the position taken in RUPA, which instead appears to rest on the
assumption that most creditors intend to proceed only against partnership assets unless insuffi-
cient assets are available to pay the debt. See infra text accompanying note 45. This is consistent
with the Reporter's position that the entity theory alone should not control policy decisions.
45. This assumption was stated in the ABA Report. See ABA Report, supra note 9, at 143,
stating, "We believe that this result woul.d be most consistent with general business expectations
today." The language from the ABA Report is quoted in the Comments to § 307(c). The Com-
ments note that "Sections (c) and (d) represent an attempt to implement in detail the general
suggestion in the ABA Report at 143 [quoting from the Report]." The language from the Report
which is quoted in the Comments to § 307(c) reads in full as follows:
We also believe section 15 should be amended to make clear that a judgment creditor
does not have the right to proceed against one or more partners to collect on a judg-
ment based on a partnership liability until the partnership assets have been exhausted.
This rule would respect the concept of the partnership as an entity and would provide
that the partners are more in the nature of guarantors than principal debtors on every
partnership debt. We believe that this result would be most consistent with general
business expectations today.
46. One court opinion that does address the policy question, Ryan v. Brophy, 755 F. Supp.
595, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), does so in the following terms: "The policy underlying this distinction
seems to be that in ordinary contract disputes, partners should be protected from individual
liability and the resultant need to seek contribution from each other if the partnership has suffi-
cient assets to satisfy the judgment." This explanation does not explain why partners should be
so protected, however. Although Ryan does not suggest a reason, perhaps the difference is that
creditors with contract claims willingly came into contact with the partnership, whereas tort vic-
tims do not. See Note, Liability for Partnership Debts in Louisiana: Is There a More Equitable
Solution?, 35 Loy. L. REv. 467 (1989), suggesting this difference. Yet partners also are willing
parties to the contractual relationship, which neutralizes this reasoning.
Another case that discusses policy is Seligman v. Friedlander, 92 N.E. 1047, 1050 (N.Y. 1910),
where the court states,
When a partnership debt is incurred, it presumptively creates partnership assets and
should in reason be paid therefrom, and not until they are exhausted should individual
property be proceeded against. No reason is apparent for leaving all the assets in the
possession of the survivors upon the death of one of the partners and yet making the
representatives of the latter liable in the first instance without touching the partnership
assets.
The second sentence in this quotation is the key to understanding it. The context of the Seligman
case is that of a claim being first made against the estate of a deceased partner. This is not an
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demic literature47 on the merits of denying creditors immediate access
to the assets of partners.
No surveys or studies are cited in either the ABA Report or the
Draft in support of the assumption that making partners guarantors
of collection only is "consistent with general business expectations to-
day." 48 There is authority asserting the contrary. 49 Also, the assump-
tion contradicts common sense because it treats all partnerships the
same.50 Of course, they differ vastly. Creditors making loans to an
established partnership of 150 partners with ten offices scattered
throughout the world doubtless would contemplate proceeding first
against partnership assets and probably would consider unthinkable
any effort to track down and sue individual partners in such a large
enterprise. On the other hand, creditors of a new, small business
probably consider the solvency of the partners first and foremost
when making a loan. Such creditors would be relying on the personal
creditworthiness of partners and would want the option to proceed
against them without the delay and expense involved in having first to
prove the partnership insolvent.5 1 This would be true in at least some
appealing situation, particularly when the surviving partners are continuing the business. See
supra note 40. The first sentence of the quotation is appealing in the equitable sense that the
assets that are generated by incurring a liability should be subject to payment of the liability, but
it seems too mechanical in application. Often it will be impossible to trace the particular assets
generated by a debt, and sometimes debt is incurred in order to pay off other debts. It does not
seem appropriate to require creditors to try to trace assets generated by their loans in every case
simply because in a few cases that can be done.
47. But see Donald Campbell, Partnership Obligations and Their Enforcement, 32 Cm.-
KENr L. REv. 127, 129 (1953), stating the following:
[I]t is difficult to perceive why the Uniform Partnership Act did not declare all part-
nership obligations to be joint and several in conformity with statutory provisions
dealing with joint rights and obligations such as exist in most jurisdictions, provisions
intended to remedy the contrary harsh theory of the common law, with its attendant
procedural difficulties. One of the risks which any partner undertakes is that of being
personally called upon to pay all partnership obligations. If he does so, he has his own
recourse against his fellows. Why, then, should not this ultimate risk be made immedi-
ate, and arise at the time of the original undertaking? Why place the burden of seek-
ing out and pursuing hidden or absent partners upon those who deal with
partnerships? Why not suit and judgment against any convenient partner, leaving it to
him to settle with his fellows?
48. See supra note 45.
49. See Horn's Crane Service v. Prior, 152 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb. 1967) (Smith, J. dissent-
ing): "Does the businessman intend primarily to extend credit to the firm? [Williston and Lewis]
gave negative answers in 1915 [citations omitted]. An affirmative answer is not obvious even in
1967."
50. Of course, any default rule is going to lump together disparate situations. One could
make the same assertion about the default rule proposed by the author. The real issue being
addressed is upon whom should the burden be placed of contracting out of the default rule. This
will be developed later in the text. See infra text accompanying note 54.
51. It is true that § 307(d), supra note 27, contains exceptions to the duty of a creditor to
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situations, perhaps in most situations. Although creditors can contract
with each individual partner at the time of extending credit for a
waiver of guarantor of collection only status, why should creditors be
the ones to bear this burden?5 2
The role of RUPA is to establish the most appropriate default
rule-the rule that would apply if the parties do not address a particu-
lar matter in their contract. A default rule should approximate what
partners and creditors would fairly expect under the circumstances in-
volved.53 This is not always easy to determine. Nevertheless, it seems
reasonable to conclude that most people would expect that the burden
of clarification of guarantor of collection versus primary obligor
status should be placed on the partners themselves. The partners are
the owners of the business and are personally liable for its obliga-
tions.54 Also, partners have indemnification and exoneration rights
against the partnership for payments made or liabilities incurred with
respect to partnership obligations.55 If the partnership is unable to in-
demnify, partners have contribution rights against fellow partners for
first exhaust partnership assets. But the burdens of satisfying the exceptions may be substantial,
and the language of the exceptions is vague. Unless bankruptcy or a specific agreement exist, a
"finding" that the partnership assets are "clearly insufficient," or exhaustion of them is "exces-
sively burdensome," or that a grant of permission to proceed against individual assets "is an
appropriate exercise of the court's inherent equitable powers" is required. The requirement of a
finding would require the marshalling of evidence and a hearing, which would entail expense and
delay.
52. See infra text accompanying note 54, developing this point.
53. This leaves one with the question of perspective. Does one define a default rule from
the perspective of a large and sophisticated business, as the ABA Report, supra note 9, seems to
do? Or is the small, informal business the proper perspective? It is a matter of some irony that,
although the Draft adopts without hesitation the perspective of the Report on the relationship of
creditors to partners, with regard to other matters it states that "[t]he aggregate approach at
times seems particularly well suited to the small partnership, and the Drafting Committee has
determined that the primary focus of RUPA should be the small partnership, including the inad-
vertent partnership." Draft, supra note 1, at 2.
54. See Draft, supra note 1, at § 306.
55. Indemnification rights against the partnership are established in § 401(c), where it is
stated that "[t]he partnership shall indemnify each partner in respect to payments reasonably
made and personal liabilities reasonably incurred by the partner in the ordinary and proper con-
duct of the business of the partnership or for the preservation of its business or property."
Section 401(c) is based directly on § 18(b) of UPA. For a representative case interpreting § 18(b),
see Head v. Henry Tyler Const. Corp., 539 So. 2d 196, 199 (Ala. 1988) ("[E]very partner [is
allowed] indemnification from the partnership for personal liabilities incurred, absent any modi-
fication agreed upon by the partners themselves."). The indemnity right includes protecting the
partner from having to expend personal funds under circumstances where the firm is solvent. See
BROMBERO & Rmsnw, supra note 11, at 6:24, citing Bass v. Daetwyler, 305 S.W.2d 339 (Mo.
App. 1957). This right is not technically identified as exoneration, an equitable remedy designed
to protect sureties from unnecessarily advancing their own funds by giving them the right to
force the primary obligor to pay the obligation at stake. Instead, it is explained on the ground
that indemnification extends not only to payments made but also to liabilities incurred by the
partner. The effect, however, is the same as exoneration.
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payments made to creditors of the firm. 5 6 These remedies substantially
reduce the burdens on individual partners but do not altogether elimi-
nate the burdens. The partners, however, are the ones who profit
from the business in an ownership capacity, who have control over the
business and the allocation of firm assets, and who should assume
primary responsibility for discharge of its obligations.57
Also, placing the burden of clarification on the partners is the
soundest approach economically. It would reduce the cost of credit to
partnerships because the costs of the extension of credit and of collec-
tion would be lessened. Creditors would not have to bargain for im-
mediate access to the assets of individual partners each time they
extend credit, thus reducing the transaction costs of extending credit.5 8
56. Contribution rights arise through interaction of several sections of the Act. The relevant
sections of UPA will first be described, and then the corresponding sections in RUPA identified.
As stated in BROmERG & RinsmN, supra note 11, at 6:23, referring in part to § 18(a) of UPA,
"A partner who pays or incurs a personal liability to a third party on behalf of the partnership
becomes a creditor of the partnership in the amount of the payment or liability, in effect subro-
gated to the rights of the creditor." If the partnership does not pay, the obligation falls on the
copartners of the partner who paid the obligation. See § 40(b)(II) of UPA, recognizing the status
of a partner as creditor, and § 40(d), stating that partners must contribute the amounts necessary
to satisfy liabilities under § 40(b), as provided by § 18(a). See Smith v. Wohl, 702 S.W.2d 905,
911 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) ("Further, a partner who has paid more than his share of a partner-
ship's obligation has the right to seek reimbursement from his co-partners in proportion to their
responsibility.").
The sections of RUPA are substantially the same as those of UPA. Section 401(b) of RUPA,
which is based on § 18(a), specifies that "[tihe partnership shall ... charge each partner with a
share of the losses, whether capital or operating, of the partnership." Draft, supra note 1, at §
401(b). Section 807(d) of RUPA, which is based on § 40(d), states that the partners "shall con-
tribute, as provided by Section 401(b), the amount necessary to satisfy the liabilities .... .
Draft, supra note 1, at § 807(d).
The wording of § 401(b) has been changed from "contribute towards the losses" in § 18(a) to
"charge each partner with a share of losses." The Comments to § 401 indicate that this was done
to state that losses incurred while a firm is ongoing ordinarily are charged to a partner's capital
account and are personally charged to a partner only upon dissolution or liquidation. The Com-
ments state, "The Committee wanted to avoid an obligation to contribute to losses prior to
withdrawal or liquidation." Draft, supra note 1, at 57. This seems a little strange, and may
create difficulties in the future for partners who seek contribution before dissolution, a remedy
that both UPA and RUPA appear to contemplate. Although usually an indemnification right is
pursued in an accounting action following dissolution, a predissolution accounting is available
under § 406 to "protect the rights and interests of the partner." Further, if the claim is isolated,
relief may be granted the partner even without an accounting. BRommERo & RiasT E, supra note
11, at 6:27-6:28.
57. This reasoning applies to sole proprietorships and partnerships and not to businesses
organized under state legislation exempting owners from personal liability, such as corporations.
Dean Weidner is correct when he states that the law in this country has developed a tolerance for
exempting owners from liability, but this is true only when a relevant statute so specifies and the
organization is properly qualified under the statute. See Weidner, A Perspective, supra note 14,
at 38.
58. This would apply in particular to credit arrangements generated by sales on credit to a
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And, if individual access is not separately arranged with each partner,
creditors would not have to calculate into the cost of the credit the
risk of expense and delay in having to prove that partnership assets
are unavailable before having the right to collect on their debts from
individual partners.
If inconvenience is caused during the process of obtaining payment
of valid debts of the business, that inconvenience should fall upon the
partners,5 9 absent express agreement otherwise. The creditor should be
required to alleviate partners of this burden only if he agrees to it.60
Thus, if the individual partners desire the status of guarantors of
collection only, they should bear the initiative of contracting for guar-
antor status with their creditors. Doubtless, few creditors would will-
ingly agree to such a restriction, 61 which underscores the fact that the
assumption underlying section 307(c) may be erroneous. Therefore,
the burden placed upon a creditor in section 307(d)(2) to obtain an
agreement from the partners that the creditor need not first exhaust
partnership assets should be reversed.
III. RUPA AND EXPULSION CLAusES: A SuciEsTioN FOR
CLARIFICATION OF STANDARDS
Expulsion clauses are addressed in § 601(2) of the Draft, which
reads as follows: "A partner dissociates from a partnership upon the
partnership, where the structured, deliberative process involved in many bank loans may not be
duplicated, thus making obtaining a waiver from every partner less likely as a routine matter.
59. Curiously, the Draft in its Comment to § 306 endorses the characterization of the liabil-
ity of individual partners as joint and several by referring to its convenience for creditors:
mhe joint-only feature places the burden on the [creditor] to find all of the part-
ners.... On the other hand, even when there is several liability and only one partner
is named and served in the action, that partner can bring all other partners in by cross-
complaining against them or seeking a contribution remedy. Thus, the burden of en-
suring equitable distribution of the impact of the liability is on the partners ....
Draft, supra note 1, at § 306. Yet in § 307 the language of the Comment ignores a partner's right
to contribution and appears indifferent to the burdens § 307 places on creditors. Draft, supra
note 1, at § 307.
60. On the other hand, it may be appropriate for a court to insist on exhaustion of joint
assets when the claim is being made by one partner against other partners, because of the differ-
ent interests involved. This distinction is drawn in People v. Knapp, 99 N.E. 841, 844 (N.Y.
1912), where the court states:
As between the partners themselves the assets are marshalled in equity so that joint
assets are first used in the payment of joint debts and several assets in the payment of
several debts. This rule, however, does not bind creditors who may select any partner
and collect their claims wholly from the property of that partner.
61. As mentioned earlier, creditors of large, well established businesses may constitute an
exception to the statement made above. See supra note 50 and text following.
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occurrence of any of the following:... (2) The expulsion of the part-
ner in accordance with the partnership agreement."
The language of subsection (2) is similar to the language of UPA
section 31(l)(d) except that the phrase "bona fide" is omitted. 62 The
portion of the Comment to section 601 that addresses subsection (2)
contains two sentences that read: "No change in substance is intended
by the deletion of the words 'bona fide.' The mandatory63 duty of
good faith and fair dealing in RUPA Section 404(a)64 applies to the
expulsion situation."
The Comment also quotes the following language from Bromberg
and Ribstein, a leading treatise:
It has been held that the expelling partners need not prove that the
expulsion was in good faith or for good cause shown, and that the
duty of good faith does not require that expulsion be conditioned on
any particular procedures, such as notice, a specification of charges,
or an opportunity to be heard. 6
The above quotations contain all of the language in the Comment
relevant to expulsion. No language in the Comment addresses the ap-
parent inconsistency between the sentence invoking section 404(a) and
the Bromberg and Ribstein quote, which exist side by side in the Com-
ment, one asserting that good faith applies to expulsions and the other
seeming to deny that the expelling partners are subject to a standard
of good faith. 66
62. Section 31(l)(d) of UPA reads as follows: "Dissolution is caused: (d) By the expulsion
of any partner from the business bona fide in accordance with such a power conferred by the
agreement between the partners." UNwoam PARNmuSmP ACT, § 31(l)(d), 6 U.L.A. 376 (Master
ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991).
63. Section 105 of the Draft lists five situations where the standards prescribed by RUPA
are mandatory. It reads in part as follows: "Unless the partnership provides otherwise, this [Act]
governs the relations among partners. However, the partnership agreement may not: ... (2)
eliminate the duty of good faith and fair dealing under Section 404(a)..
64. Section 404(a) reads as follows:
(a) A partner has a duty of good faith and fair dealing towards the partnership and
the other partners in all matters related to the formation, conduct and liquidation of
the partnership. This duty may not be eliminated by agreement, but the parties by
agreement may identify specific conduct that does not violate the duty if the conduct
is not manifestly unreasonable.... (c) A partner does not violate either the duty of
good faith and fair dealing or the duty of loyalty merely because the partner's conduct
furthers the partner's individual interest.
Draft, supra note 1, at § 404(a). The assumption underlying the decision to delete the phrase
"bona fide" in the Draft doubtless was to avoid redundancy because under section 404(a) good
faith applies to all partnership matters, not just expulsion as it did in UPA.
65. BROMBERO & RiasTaN, supra note 11, at 7:28.
66. Of course, the two propositions also can be read in a way that will harmonize them.
RUPA
Read one way, there is no difference between UPA and RUPA with
regard to expulsion clauses. Both statutes require good faith when a
partner is expelled pursuant to an expulsion clause. Yet the Draft can
be read in a different way, to invite expansion of the interpretation of
"bona fide" beyond that described by Bromberg and Ribstein in the
above quotation. The Draft places its mandatory good faith standard
in a much wider context than does UPA. This invites a broader read-
ing of good faith; also, the phrase "and fair dealing" is added in the
Draft to the language of good faith and applied to the expulsion situa-
tion.67 As explained below, this could lead to more intrusive judicial
scrutiny of expulsions under RUPA. It is debatable whether this
would be wise policy. At a minimum, efforts should be made to clar-
ify the intended scope of RUPA on this issue. This matter will be ap-
proached by reviewing some of the key decisions that have been made
under UPA while using a good faith standard.
The expulsion process" involves both the decision to expel and the
process by which the decision is made and implemented. It also in-
cludes an evaluation and payout stage, during which the expelled part-
ner's economic interest in the partnership is defined and terminated.
Does the mandatory duty of good faith apply to all aspects of this
process, or can it sensibly be argued that it should be more limited in
scope?
A. The Decision to Expel a Partner
Exploration of the good faith of an expulsion at this stage involves
an inquiry into motive. This is an inquiry that the expelling partners
The Bromberg and Ribstein quote is referring to judicial decisions that interpreted "bona fide"
in UPA to require only compliance with the provisions of the partnership agreement governing
expulsion and a fair accounting of the expelled partner's economic interest in the firm. The
Comment to § 601(2) can be read as expressing approval of this approach. Yet the reader is left
with the impression that the drafting committee would not endorse an approach so narrow. See
infra text accompanying notes 105-07. In any event the meaning in RUPA of "good faith and
fair dealing" in this context should be made clear. See infra text accompanying note 108, sug-
gesting an amendment to § 601(2).
67. See supra note 64. The phrase "and fair dealing" is not defined in the Draft. It is
unclear what role it may play in the formulation of standards in this area. Doubtless, however,
the addition of the phrase was intended by the Drafting Committee to add something of a sub-
stantive nature to the good faith language. It would otherwise be simply redundant.
68. The Draft refers to it as the expulsion "situation." Draft, supra note 1, at 94. This is
ambiguous, but probably the intent was to cover the entire expulsion process. Courts are always
free to narrow the scope of the duty, of course. But it would be preferable if the narrowing of
scope were done within the statute itself, in the interests of both certainty and uniformity. See
infra text accompanying note 108.
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would fear most because it is by its nature open-ended. Would the
expelling partners under the standard posed by section 601(2) have to
prove good cause for expulsion, establishing that their purpose in ex-
pelling a partner was proper and justifiable? If so, what would distin-
guish the status of the expelled partner from that of a person enjoying
the privileges of tenure where termination of employment is allowed
only upon a showing of good cause? Would this be a proper burden
to place on private partnerships without their consent?69 What role
would the language of the expulsion clause play? It is this latter ques-
tion that will first be addressed.
There are three different types of expulsion clauses. These can sub-
stantially affect the application of the general good faith standard set
forth in the Draft, as developed below.
1. Clauses Specifying the Causes of Expulsion ("For Cause"
Clauses)
An illustration of a "for cause" clause would be one providing that
a partner can be expelled only for reasons of "inactivity, disability,
neglect of business, immorality, professional misconduct, shrinkage
of business, breach of the partnership articles, and conflicting outside
interests. '70 With this clause, the partners have limited their own
range of choice and have exposed themselves to an inquiry into their
motives for an expulsion. This presents the easiest case for application
of a broad good faith standard. All a court need do is ask whether the
expelling partners have complied in good faith with their own stan-
dards. It may be that the words "bona fide" in the UPA were in-
tended to refer to this situation.7 1
2. Clauses Specifying Only the Process of Expulsion ("Silent"
Clauses)
An illustration of a "silent" clause would be one providing that
"any member may be expelled from the Firm by a majority vote of
69. By choice, school systems and universities make tenure an explicit part of the contracts
with their instructors. See Annotation, Construction and Effect of Tenure Provisions of Con-
tract or Statute Governing Employment of College or University Faculty Member, 66 A.L.R.3d
1018 (1975 & Supp. 1990). This is quite different from a statute or judicial decision imposing the
burdens of tenure onto private contracting parties, especially persons contracting for a.partner-
ship relationship, with its attendant risks and vicarious liabilities.
70. This list is taken from MARL N Voiz & ARTiam L. BERGER, TEE Da=ATno OF PARr-
NERsmp AGREEMErs 95-96 (6th ed. 1976). The "for cause" clause can be drafted either as an
exclusive list, like the clause quoted above in the text, or it can specify that its list is nonexclu-
sive. In the latter situation, it is likely that a court would interpret the clause to limit causes to
those similar to the ones listed. See E. Au. FARIswoRT, CoN'r.crs 515-16 (2d ed. 1990),
describing the rules of construction under such circumstances.
71. See § 31(1)(d), 6 U.L.A. 376 (1969).
R UPA
the Executive Committee." 7 2 Nothing is said about the reasons for ex-
pulsion. Only the means by which expulsion can be accomplished are
specified.
As noted above, UPA qualifies its expulsion provision by the words
"bona fide." Several cases have arisen under "silent" clauses where
expelled partners in jurisdictions that had adopted UPA have urged
courts to apply a good faith standard to their expulsion and inquire
into the cause of the expulsion despite compliance by the expelling
partners with the form of process specified. A representative and well-
known case is Holman v. Coie.73 Holman involved a twenty-two-per-
son law partnership practicing in Seattle. The expulsion clause is the
one quoted above, stating that "any member may be expelled from
the Firm by a majority vote of the Executive Committee." The part-
nership agreement did not specify whether expulsion had to be with or
without cause, nor did it list any grounds for expulsion.
The Executive Committee consisted of ten partners. By majority
vote it expelled two partners, the Holman brothers, both of whom
were members of the Executive Committee. Several weeks before ex-
pulsion Francis Holman, a member of the Washington Legislature,
had made statements during a legislative debate regarding personal
property tax legislation that high ranking officers in the Boeing Com-
pany, a client of the firm, found offensive.74 A vice president of
Boeing complained to the managing partner of the firm. Soon thereaf-
ter an informal meeting of all members of the Committee, except the
Holman brothers, was held. The issue of expulsion of the Holman
brothers was discussed in detail for more than nine hours.
A second meeting was scheduled. The Holman brothers were in-
vited and attended. A proposed resolution was read aloud, expelling
them. No reasons were given, despite their request for reasons. 75 A
72. Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 517 (Wash. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1011
(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 984 (1975) (quoting language from a partnership agreement).
73. Id.
74. This was not the first time Francis Holman had irritated Boeing. In the month preced-
ing the speech the president of Boeing had advised the managing partner of the firm that Boeing
desired Mr. Holman to do no further legal work on its behalf. Apparently this stemmed at least
in part from a local newspaper column that had praised Mr. Holman as a tax reform maverick
who was independent from his client, Boeing. Id. at 518.
75. The negative inference with regard to the cause for expulsion that can be drawn from
these facts is compelling. But life outside of Hollywood entertainment is more complex than first
appears. The opinion notes that the Holman brothers had been admitted to the firm during the
tenure of their father, a well-respected and distinguished senior partner of the firm. Apparently
the relations of the other partners with the Holman brothers had never been harmonious. The
court stated that, before the admission of the brothers to the Executive Committee,
[T]he committee's meetings had been pleasant, friendly, and characterized by a spirit
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vote was taken and the resolution was approved 7-2.76
The Holmans sued the partnership for breach of the partnership
agreement, breach of trust, and conspiracy. They also commenced
an action for an accounting, which later was terminated by volun-
tary nonsuit. Plaintiffs argued that the partnership agreement was
breached by (i) expelling them without cause, (ii) failing to state the
reasons for expulsion, and (iii) failing to allow them an opportunity
to be heard. 77
The court opinion noted that none of the three objections raised
by plaintiffs was based on language in the partnership agreement.
Plaintiffs argued that such limitations on expulsion were necessarily
implied in the agreement. The trial court rejected this argument,
finding the agreement to be a complete integration and granting
summary judgment. The appellate court concurred, noting,
"[A]dditional requirements should not be added to unambiguous
expulsion provisions." 78
Plaintiffs also argued that the expulsion was not in good faith,
pointing to UPA section 31(1)(d) and its use of the phrase "bona
fide. 17 9 The court defined bona fide as "[iun or with good faith"80
and acknowledged that "the general rule of law is that the partners
in their dealings with each other must exercise good faith. ' ' The
court applied the standard of good faith as follows:
of unselfishness and devotion to the best interests of the firm. However, after admis-
sion of the Holmans, there appeared to develop a polarization among the committee,
with the Holmans on one side and the remainder of the committee on the other. There
is also testimony which would indicate that a number of years prior to the expulsion
some consideration had been given to requesting the Holmans to leave the firm.
Id. at 517.
76. It does not take a great leap of imagination to guess the identity of the two dissenting
votes.
77. Id. at 519. A procedural argument of lack of proper notice also was made and dis-
missed by the court on the basis of construction of the partnership agreement.
78. Id. at 522. See also Smart v. Hernandez, 66 A.2d 643 (N.H. 1959); McPherson v. J.E.
Sirrine & Co., 33 S.E.2d 501, 510 (S.C. 1945) ("It is not the province of the court to alter a
contract by construction or to make a new contract for the parties.. ."). This approach is not
the only one that could be taken. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Preventing Partnership Freezeouts,
40 MERCER L. REV. 535, 579 (1989) (suggesting that "it is just as rational to assume the parties
intended an implicit requirement of reasonable grounds for removal-rather than subject their
interests completely to the whims of other partners-as it is to assume the parties consciously
omitted such protection because of a desire to avoid litigation").
79. The UPA became law in Washington in 1955. WAsH. Rnv. CODE ANN. § 25.04.010-.430
(1974).
80. Holman, 522 P.2d at 523. In doing so the court quoted from the fourth edition of
Black's Law Dictionary. The definition of bona fide reads in full as follows: "In or with good
faith; honestly, openly, and sincerely; without deceit or fraud." Id.
81. Id.
RUPA
However, the personal relationships between partners to which the
terms "bona fide" and "good faith" relate are those which have a
bearing upon the business aspects or property of the partnership and
prohibit a partner, to-wit, a fiduciary, from taking any personal
advantage touching those subjects. (Citation omitted.) Plaintiffs'
claims do not relate to the business aspects or property rights of this
partnership. There is no evidence the purpose of the severance was to
gain any business or property advantage to the remaining partners.
Consequently, in that context, there has been no showing of breach
of the duty of good faith toward plaintiffs.82
The court gives some focus to the meaning of "bona fide" or good
faith, narrowing the inquiry to whether the purpose of the expulsion
was to gain a business or property advantage against the expelled part-
ner. The partnership agreement involved in Holman provided a
method of compensation upon expulsion. The court stated: "We must
assume those provisions have been properly complied with in view of
plaintiffs' acceptance of the accounting." 83 The plaintiffs' acceptance
of the accounting satisfied the court that they had no claim based
upon good faith. Thus, the court appears to confine an inquiry into
good faith to determining whether the plaintiffs' economic interests in
the firm were fairly and accurately evaluated and paid to them.
The court's definition contains some language that is vague, such as
whether the plaintiffs' claims relate to the "business aspects" of the
partnership, or whether the purpose of the severance is to gain a
"property advantage." This could open the decision making process
to wide-ranging inquiries into motive, depending on how broadly one
defines "business aspects" or "property advantage." One can argue,
for example, that the expelling partners gain a business advantage
through expulsion because the partnership income is divided into
fewer shares. Under that definition, all expulsions would require an
inquiry into good faith because reduction in the number of shares is
an inevitable consequence of expulsion. Yet the decision of the court
on this issue, while somewhat conclusory,14 can be read to limit the
inquiry to a fair evaluation and payout of the expelled partner's eco-
nomic interest in the firm. This interpretation of good faith puts some
parameters around an otherwise vague concept.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 521.
84. As quoted in the text, the court states that, "There is no evidence the purpose of the
severance was to gain any business or property advantage to the remaining partners. Conse-
quently, in that context, there has been no showing of breach of the duty of good faith toward
plaintiffs." Id. at 523. The court does not develop its explanation further.
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Finally, the court discussed plaintiffs' argument that good faith also
requires compliance with basic procedural due process standards. The
argument apparently was based largely on an article in an English
journal where the author argued that: "[Tihe rules of natural justice
are an essential legal prerequisite in the determination of [an expul-
sion]. This is so because partners in this circumstance are acting as a
'tribunal ... invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters in-
volving civil consequences to individuals."'"" The article concludes
that a partner is entitled to notice, a hearing, and reasons before ex-
pulsion. This argument was rejected by the court on the reasoning
that the actions of the partners were within the contemplation of their
agreement.8 6 The court elaborated on this as follows:
While this course of action may shock the sensibilities of some, to
others it may be that once the initial decision is made, the traumatic
reaction to that decision is more quickly overcome and the end result
more merciful. However that course of action may appear to the
reader, the possibility of exactly such action occurring is clear from
reading the agreement .... In view of our holding that the executive
committee had the right to expel plaintiffs without stating reason or
cause pursuant to the partnership agreement, there was no breach of
any fiduciary duty.87
Another important and recent case on this subject is Lawlis v. Kigh-
tlinger & Gray.88 Lawlis, a senior partner of the defendant law firm,
had developed a problem of alcoholism. 9 The firm, upon discovery of
the situation, contacted experts in alcoholism and set conditions for
his continuing relationship with the firm. These conditions included
meeting with specialists for treatment of his condition. His income
from the partnership was reduced as he battled his problem.
85. Id. at 524 (quoting B. Davies, Good Faith Principle and the Expulsion Clause in Part-
nership Law, 33 CONVEYANCE & PROPERTY LAW. 32 (1969)). The author of the quoted article
seems to be confusing state action against individuals and private action pursuant to private
agreements.
86. The court stated that the defendants "chose to adopt the guillotine approach, rather
than a more diplomatic approach, to the expulsion of partners." Id.
87. Id. One predictable situation that the expelling partners may want to avoid by not giv-
ing reasons and opening up discussion of them is exposure to and lack of control over a bitter
and personal counterattack by the partners being expelled.
88. 562 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
89. Lawlis became a partner in 1971 and a senior partner in 1975. His alcoholism problem
developed in 1982. Id. at 437.
RUPA
After one relapse, Lawlis stopped drinking in March 1984. After
being congratulated by several partners on his "100% turn around,"
Lawlis felt that "a substantial restoration of my previous status was
past due."' 9 He met with the Finance Committee on October 1, 1986,
and proposed a substantial increase in his income.9' Three weeks later
the Finance Committee responded by informing Lawlis that they were
going to recommend that his relationship with the firm be severed no
later than June 30, 1987. He would be able to retain his status as a
senior partner until that time to facilitate his transition to other em-
ployment and to keep his insurance coverage intact. He could draw
$25,000 from the firm during that time. Two days after this conversa-
tion, all firm files were removed from his office.
Lawlis refused to consent to this and retained counsel to represent
his interests.92 He thereafter was expelled by a 7-1 vote of the senior
partners.93 The partnership agreement provided as follows with regard
to expulsion: "A two-thirds (2/3) majority of the Senior Partners, at
any time, may expel any partner from the partnership upon such
terms and conditions as set by said Senior Partners. ' 94
Lawlis filed suit for breach of contract contending, among other
things, that his expulsion contravened the agreement's implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing because he was expelled for the "preda-
tory purpose" of "increasing [the firm's] lawyer to partner ratio." 95
90. Id. at 438.
91. Partnership compensation was based on a unit system. Every year units were assigned
to each partner by the partnership. Lawlis proposed that his units be increased from 60 to 90
units in 1987. The units were not further described in the opinion. Id.
92. The severance recommendation was presented at the 1986 year-end senior partners
meeting. All except Lawlis voted to accept it. Id. at 438.
93. Id. The expulsion took place on February 23, 1987. The timing of these events enabled
Lawlis to argue that technically dissolution had taken place at the time the files were taken from
his office because he ceased at that time "to be associated in the carrying on ... of the busi-
ness." UPA § 29. (The UPA was adopted into law in Indiana in 1949. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-4-
1-1 to 23-4-1-43 (Bums 1986)). He argued that the dissolution was wrongful because he was in
effect being expelled without following the provisions for expulsion in the partnership agree-
ment. The court rejected this by pointing to the continued participation by Lawlis in the profits
of the firm subsequent to the taking of the files from his office. This means that he remained a
partner "even though he evidently had nothing to do." Lawlis, 562 N.E.2d at 439.
94. Id. at 439-40 (emphasis deleted).
95. Id. at 440 (quoting from the brief filed by Lawis). Lawlis quoted from a five-year"
growth plan promulgated on November 25, 1986: "The goal is to increase the top partners to at
least $150,000 within the next two to three years.... In order to achieve the goal, we need to
continue to improve our lawyer to partner ratio." Id. Lawlis drew from his expulsion the infer-
ence that "[t]he easiest way for the Partnership to improve its lawyer to partner ratio, and thus
increase the top partners' salaries, was to eliminate a senior partner.... The remaining partners
... pounced upon the opportunity to devour Lawlis' partnership interest." Id.
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The appellate court observed that, if true, this argument would pre-
vail, in view of the language defining bona fide in UPA section
31(1)(d).96 The undisputed facts, however, convinced the court that
the inference Lawlis drew was inaccurate. Among these facts were the
efforts made by the firm to help Lawlis cope with alcoholism. These
efforts included permitting him to draw funds even though he became
increasingly unproductive, allowing him to take substantial time off
from work to attempt cures at sanatoriums, and giving him a second
chance after his relapse despite the lack of obligation to do so.
The court buttressed its conclusion by quoting extensively from the
Holman case, in particular the language confining good faith analysis
to "the business aspects or property of the partnership," 97 and con-
cluding that, "[s]ubstantially the same consideration present in Hol-
man, i.e., potential damage to partnership business, is present in this
case." 98 The court also agreed with Holman on the validity of the
"guillotine method" of involuntary severance, that is, no notice or
hearing, only a severance vote to terminate need be taken. The intent
of the partners "was to provide a simple, practical, and above all, a
speedy method of separating a partner from the firm, if that ever be-
came necessary for any reason. We find no fault with that approach
to severance. '" 99 As the court stated in summary:
Where the remaining partners in a firm deem it necessary to expel a
partner under a no cause expulsion clause in a partnership agreement
freely negotiated and entered into, the expelling partners act in
"good faith" regardless of motivation if that act does not cause a
wrongful withholding of money or property legally due the expelled
partner at the time he is expelled.... If we were to hold otherwise,
we would be engrafting a "for cause" requirement upon this
agreement when such was not the intent of the parties at the time
they entered into their agreement. 10
96. The court noted that "[i]t would be a simple matter to extrapolate [from] the principle
that an employer may terminate an at will employee for any cause or no cause without liability"
to the relationship involved in the case before it, which also is an at will relationship. "The
Indiana Uniform Partnership Act, however, prevents us from so doing." Id. at 440 (citing to §
31(l)(d)).
97. Id. at 442.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 442-43. A literal application of this standard would seem to make unnecessary the
portion of the opinion that addresses the efforts by the firm to help Lawlis cope with alcoholism.
But some courts seem to find irresistible the temptation to address the reasons for and the merits
of the actions of the expelling partners, even when the opinion states that the case does not turn
on that. See also infra note 103 (cases dealing with "no cause" clauses).
RUPA
The case authority on this matter is not substantial, but it appears
that the Holman and Lawlis cases reflect the views of most courts
when dealing with "silent" clauses in partnership agreements. As the
above excerpts from the opinions make clear, the courts are strongly
inclined to respect the language of the partnership agreement and not
to read additional terms into it.101
3. "No Cause" Clauses
These clauses differ only slightly from those discussed in Part 2.
They differ in the sense that they make it expressly clear that the part-
nership has no contractual obligation to explain the cause of expulsion
to the expelled partner. An illustration of this type of clause is con-
tained below:
If the continued membership of a Partner in the Partnership is, for
any reason, determined not to be in the best interest of the
Partnership as determined by seventy-five percent (75%) in Interest
of the Class "A" Partners entitled to vote, said determination [is] to
be made without any regard to cause or fault on the part of the
Partner being expelled.'02
It would take a bold court to read into such clause a good faith
limitation requiring that the expulsion be with cause. It appears that
no court has done so. There is judicial authority supporting the en-
forcement of such a clause in addition to the obvious inferences of
support that can be drawn from the Holman and Lawlis cases.103 If a
court did choose to override such specific contractual language, it
would seem necessary to reach doctrinally outside of the bona fide
limitation of section 31(l)(d). The doctrine of unconscionability
101. See also Smart v. Hernandez, 66 A.2d 643 (N.H. 1949); McPherson v. J.E. Sirrine &
Co., 33 S.E.2d 501 (S.C. 1945); Gill v. Mallory, 80 N.Y.S.2d 155 (App. Div. 1948).
102. Reid v. Bickel & Brewer, 1990 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 11589, *14 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
103. See Gelder Medical Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 576-77 (N.Y. 1977) (expulsion
of partner under medical partnership agreement providing for expulsion without cause; the court
concluded that to impose a good faith showing "would nullify the right to expel without cause
and frustrate the obvious intention of the agreement to avoid bitter and protracted litigation
over the reason for the expulsion .... mhe agreement provision is addressed to avoiding the
necessity of showing cause and litigating the issue."). It should be noted, however, that the court
appeared to compromise the point made in the above quote by stating in dictum that
"[a]ssuming, not without question, that bad faith might limit the otherwise absolute language of
the agreement, the record does not reveal bad faith." Id. See also Reid v. Bickel & Brewer, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11589, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("[E]ven assuming that Texas would recognize
an implied good faith covenant in this partnership agreement, Reid does not present a genuine
issue that defendants breached this covenant when they expelled him."). Reid involved a no
cause covenant. See supra text accompanying note 102.
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would be the most likely vehicle for upsetting such a clause, 1°4 assum-
ing the facts support an inference of oppression and unfair surprise.
The standard common law doctrines of duress and fraud also are
available if the facts support an attack on such grounds.
B. Good Faith Under RUPA
What impact would RUPA likely have on the three types of expul-
sion clauses described above? With regard to "for cause" clauses, the
standards proposed in the Draft would make little difference because
the partners themselves by contract have invited an inquiry into their
motives and have restricted their own freedom of action.
What role, however, would the good faith and fair dealing standard
in the Draft be likely to play when a partner is expelled under a "si-
lent" clause? The Draft places special status on good faith through its
inclusion in section 404(a)105 together with the sentence in the Com-
ment to section 601(2) specifically addressing expulsion clauses and
stating that the duty of good faith is mandatory. It can be argued that
this is broader than the "bona fide" standard in UPA and that it ex-
pands the role of the courts in such situations, inviting judicial inquiry
into the reasons behind an expulsion under a "silent" clause. Al-
though good faith has been defined in economic terms in the UPA
cases of Holman and Lawlis, it could easily be broadened under the
Draft by pointing to its use in section 404(a) as well as the Comment
to section 601(2). Clearly the meaning of good faith cannot be defined
solely in economic terms when viewing it from the broad perspective
of section 404(a), which applies to a host of situations beyond expul-
sion and payout of a partner's share. Also, the added language "and
fair dealing" may be influential in buttressing a broader reading.
Thus, the precedents established under UPA may not carry the same
weight under RUPA.
One can imagine a judge operating under the seemingly broadened
standard of RUPA responding to the facts of Holman by saying that
the behavior of the majority partners was clearly in bad faith and did
not constitute fair dealing toward a fellow partner. To condone such
104. See Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 307 A.2d 598 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920
(1974) (refusing to enforce a clause in a franchise contract that gave the company the right to
terminate the lease underlying the contract on 10 days notice without cause). The court found
the bargaining power of the parties "grossly disproportionate" and held that Shell could termi-
nate only if the dealer substantially failed to perform his obligations under the lease and dealer
agreement. Thus, Shell could terminate only for good cause, as defined by the court. Id. at 603.
See also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976).
105. As noted previously, UPA has no such equivalent clause that speaks to all relations
among partners.
R UPA
behavior is to condone buckling in to the bullying behavior of a pow-
erful, arrogant client and sacrificing a partner who was merely exercis-
ing his rights of free speech. The facts of Lawlis also could be
characterized as bad faith by emphasizing the insensitivity of the ma-
jority partners to Lawlis' struggle with alcoholism. He had made a
recovery and had been sober for several years. As soon as he made a
request for an increase in income, he was expelled. There was no good
faith cause for expulsion, it could be argued.e 6 Also, Lawlis arguably
was not fairly dealt with by his fellow senior partners, and RUPA
now invites an inquiry into fair dealing, particularly under circum-
stances where the partnership agreement is silent on standards for ex-
pulsion.
Not all judges, of course, would reason that way when faced with
interpreting clauses like the ones involved in the Holman and Lawlis
cases. But the potentially broadened standard of inquiry under the
Draft increases the risk that this could happen. This could make part-
ners wishing to expel a fellow partner afraid to do so and thus vulner-
able to a coerced settlement. Alternatively, the partners would be
forced to live passively with an unacceptable situation. 0 7
With regard to "no cause" clauses, it may be that the mandatory
language of good faith and fair dealing in RUPA could be read to
qualify even such a clause. One can imagine a court saying that under
no circumstances will the language of the partnership contract control
the language of a statute in a bad faith expulsion situation.
It is debatable that such an expansive interpretation of the applica-
ble standard for expulsion would lead to an improvement in the law.
The essence of the partnership relationship is freedom of association.
As mentioned above, entering into a partnership relationship involves
risk as well as reward. The risk is intensely personal, on both fiscal
and reputational levels. The relationship is a business relationship, en-
tered into for profit. Absent gross overreaching, duress, or fraud, the
parties ought to be able to define the limits of their relationship in the
terms they wish. They alone must cope with the sometimes difficult
106. It could also be argued that the qualification of the second sentence of § 404(a), supra
note 64, is inapplicable because the conduct of expelling a partner under these circumstances is
manifestly unreasonable. See infra text accompanying note 125.
107. Of course, each partner has a power of dissolution under § 31 of UPA, but does not
always have the right to dissolve the partnership. Thus, exercise of the personal dissolution
power is not always a desirable alternative to use of an expulsion clause. The situation is more
complex under RUPA. Section 802(1) retains a power of dissolution exercisable at any time by a
partner in a partnership at will. Dissolution of a term partnership by a partner in violation of the
agreement, however, takes place under § 802(2) only if "any other partner" gives notice within
90 days after dissociation of "that partner's express will that the partnership business be wound
up." Draft, supra note 1, at § 802(2).
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personal situations that can develop in complex, long-term relation-
ships. The parties, therefore, should be the ones who control the
boundaries of their relationship, not a court standing outside the situ-
ation and second guessing actions that affect only the members of that
relationship.
C. A Proposed Amendment
The Draft should be amended to incorporate into section 601(2) the
definition of good faith that can be extrapolated from the Holman
and Lawlis cases. The Draft should state:
Except as cause for expulsion may be required by the partnership
agreement, the expelling partners comply with the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing regardless of motive if their act does not cause
a wrongful withholding of money or property legally due the
expelled partner at the time he is expelled. 0 8
This protects the interest of the expelled partner who is, after all, free
to invest his money in another business,'19 while at the same time al-
lowing the other partners to choose with whom they will associate.
Undoubtedly situations will exist where the freedom of association
advocated above will be abused by the majority of a partnership. Not
all actions of members of a partnership toward each other are fair,
not all motives are pure. Arbitrary and petty expulsions can take place
pursuant to a silent or no cause expulsion clause. But so long as the
economic stake of the expelled partner is fairly accounted for, the in-
terests of predictability and reliability and the benefits of freedom of
association outweigh the occasional abuse that the freedom will inevi-
tably entail.
IV. Tim DEFNITION OF FIDuCIARY DuTIEs: SOME QuEsTioNs ABOUT
SECTION 404 OF THE DRAFT
Fiduciary duties are defined in section 404 of the Draft. The first
paragraph of that section states: "SECTION 404. FIDUCIARY DU-
TIES OF PARTNER. The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the
108. This language is drawn from the Lawlis opinion. Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562
N.E.2d 435, 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). This assumes that the partnership agreement does not
itself specify a requirement of cause for expulsion.
109. The effect of noncompete clauses should be considered. It can be argued that, except
for legitimate protection of trade secrets, noncompete clauses should be less readily enforced
under these circumstances.
19911 RUPA
partnership and the other partners are the duty of good faith and fair
dealing, the duty of loyalty, and the duty of care, as set forth in this
section."110
Some questions will be raised below about this section. In no sense
is this brief discussion intended to be conclusive, nor is it intended to
be critical of the approach taken by the Committee in attempting to
cope with the difficult problems involved in defining terms and stan-
dards in this complex area. It is designed only to identify matters that
need further discussion.
A. The Mandatory Duty of Good Faith
The Draft states that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is man-
datory."' This is the only fiduciary duty declared to be mandatory.
The parties to a partnership agreement are free to define their rela-
tionship as they wish with regard, for example, to standards of loyalty
to the partnership and to themselves.
Throughout any piece of basic legislation defining a form of doing
business runs a tension between allowing freedom of contract among
110. The rest of § 404 states:
(a) A partner has a duty of good faith and fair dealing towards the partnership and
the other partners in all matters related to the formation, conduct, and liquidation of
the partnership. The duty may not be eliminated by agreement, but the parties by
agreement may identify specific conduct that does not violate the duty if the conduct
is not manifestly unreasonable.
(b) A partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners is limited to
the following:
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or
benefit derived by the partner without the informed consent of the other partners,
from a transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the part-
nership or from a use by the partner of partnership property;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership as, or on behalf of, an adverse party
without the informed consent of the other partners; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership without the informed consent of
the other partners.
(c) A partner does not violate either the duty of good faith and fair dealing or the duty
of loyalty merely because the partner's conduct furthers the partner's individual inter-
est. A partner may purchase, for the partner's own account or otherwise, the assets of
the partnership in a foreclosure sale or upon liquidation of the partnership.
(d) A partner has a duty to act in the conduct of the business of the partnership in a
manner that does not constitute gross negligence or willful misconduct. An error in
judgment or a failure to use ordinary skill and care does not constitute gross negli-
gence.
(e) This section applies to a person engaged in the liquidation of the business of the
partnership as the personal or legal representative of the last surviving partner as if the
person were a partner.
Draft, supra note 1, at § 404.
111. See § 105(2), quoted infra note 115, and § 404(a), quoted supra note 110. This portion
of the paper returns briefly to the good faith standard in order to address some of its broader
implications.
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the owners of the business and exercising paternalistic control over
agreements among owners. This tension has been expressly recognized
by the Reporter for RUPA. 112
The Reporter notes that the Drafting Committee for RUPA has
avoided paternalism in most situations, opting instead for freedom of
contract." 3 The assumption apparently is that contracts defining a
partnership relationship are almost never contracts of adhesion. They
do not involve circumstances of lack of personal choice or of great
inequality of bargaining power. Instead, the typical partnership in-
volves people joining together, each contributing something, to start a
business with the goal of making money. 1 4
The Draft's approach is to let the partnership agreement control the
relations among partners except for five situations specified in section
105.11 -5 As mentioned above, one of the situations is that the partner-
ship agreement may not eliminate the general duty of good faith and
fair dealing specified in section 404(a). 1 6 This seems unexceptional on
its face. Who can deny that contracting parties should act fairly and
in good faith toward each other? This should especially be true of
people who enter into the contractual relationship of partnership,
which is complex and interpersonal in nature and potentially of long-
term duration. Entering into a partnership relationship involves a
great deal of trust. In most cases a partner will not only devote con-
siderable time and energy to the business, but also will be risking his
or her reputation and personal assets as a result of the actions of fel-
low partners that the partner will not be in a position fully to control.
112. Weidner, Midstream, supra note 4, at 828.
113. Dean Weidner characterizes the choice as one between default rules and mandatory
rules. See Weidner, Midstream, supra note 4, at 827. "A default rule is one that applies only in
the absence of a provable partnership agreement to the contrary. A mandatory rule, on the other
hand, is one that applies even in the face of a partnership agreement to the contrary."
114. "Mandatory rules governing the relations among partners are essentially parentalistic,
and the Committee felt that, with only very limited exception, adults in nonconsumer transac-
tions are old enough and wise enough to be held to their agreements." Id. at 828.
115. Section 105 states:
SECTION 105. EFFECT OF PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
Unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise, this [Act] governs relations
among the partners. However, the partnership agreement may not:
(1) unreasonably restrict a partner's access to books and records under Section 403(b);
(2) eliminate the duty of good faith and fair dealing under Section 404(a);
(3) vary the power to withdraw as a partner under Section 601(1), except to require the
notice to be in writing;
(4) vary the right to expulsion of a partner by a court in the events specified in Section
601(3); or
(5) vary the requirement to wind up the partnership business in the events specified in
Sections 802(5), 802(6), and 802(9).
Draft, supra note 1, at § 105.
116. Id. § 105(2). Section 404(a) is quoted supra note 110.
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Good faith and fair dealing are the minimum one can expect under
such circumstances. Yet things are not quite so simple. The concept of
"good faith and fair dealing," undefined, is broad and open-ended.
Much can be read into it, depending on the inclinations of the reader.
Some courts will hold parties to extremely high, even impossible stan-
dards, to the extent of disregarding contractual language.'1 7 Such
cases are rare, but the fear of them renders parties vulnerable to co-
erced and excessive settlements of marginal claims made by persons
willing to exploit this uncertainty and the danger of a large and unfair
verdict.
Why is the good faith and fair dealing standard, alone of all the
standards in section 404,118 selected to be nonwaivable?" 9 The UPA
says nothing about good faith, with the exception of expulsion
clauses.120 The Draft is much more aggressive on this matter, both in
greatly expanding the scope of good faith and in making it nonwaiva-
ble, yet there is no explanation for this change of approach in the
Comments to the Draft. 2'
117. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (good faith limitation
imposed by court on lender's clearly expressed contractual power to demand repayment of loan;
$7.5 million judgment recovered against lender); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678
S.W.2d 661, 690 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (plaintiff recovered a $12 million judgment against bank
on ground of interference with business relations "without just cause or excuse" when bank
exercised its contractual rights to call loan with plaintiff if a change in the office of president and
chief executive officer was deemed adverse to the interest of the bank. "Although the lenders
may have been acting to exercise legitimate legal rights or to protect justifiable business interests,
their conduct failed to comport with the standards of fair play.").
118. The other standards in § 404 are quoted in full atsupra note 110.
119. The Reporter explains the waivability of the rest of § 404 in the following terms:
RUPA section 21(b) [now § 404] purports to be an exclusive statement of the duty of
loyalty of partners.... [It] was motivated by a sense that vague, broad statements of
a powerful duty of loyalty causes too much uncertainty. It was said that, even if there
were no bad holdings, overly broad judicial language has left practitioners uncertain
about whether their negotiated agreements will be voided. It was said that practicing
attorneys want to be able to reach a deal, put it down on paper, and know that it will
not be undone by the application of fiduciary duties. RUPA sections 4X and 21 [105
and 404] now provide an exclusive checklist of the duties of loyalty and further pro-
vide that they can all be drafted away.
Weidner, Midstream, supra note 4, at 856. The above reasoning is persuasive. One is left puz-
zled, however, why the same reasoning does not apply with equal force to the duty of good
faith.
120. UPA § 31(l)(d), which states that dissolution is caused "[b]y the expulsion of any part-
ner from the business bona fide in accordance with such a power conferred by the agreement
between the partners." 6 U.L.A. 376 (1969). The words "bona fide" are what creates a good
faith standard with regard to this provision.
121. The author has no dispute with the goal of encouraging fairness and good faith among
partners. This is a fundamental value, one of long standing in the law. See Meinhard v. Salmon,
164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). But freedom of contract also is a fundamental value. It is when the
two values conflict that troubling questions are raised. No easy solutions exist to this dilemma.
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Also, "good faith and fair dealing" is not defined in the Draft. The
Comment to section 404 states that "[tihe Committee does not intend
to define the duty of good faith and fair dealing." This leaves the
reader uncertain about how to deal with this concept.'" Apparently
the intention of the Committee is to leave it up to the courts to de-
velop standards over the years via the process of case law. This ap-
proach contains both a strength and a weakness. The strength is that
of the common law, allowing the law to develop situationally, by trial
and error, with the lawmaker being forced to determine a winner and
a loser in a specific context involving claims arising from the conflicts
of life. The weakness is that this approach invites litigation over dis-
putes where the stakes often are high and the standards are vague.
The Reporter has drawn attention to the broad prescription of good
faith in the Uniform Commercial Code, suggesting that a similar pre-
scription is appropriate to RUPA.12 But there is a difference between
the two Acts. The UCC narrowly defines good faith. 24 No attempt is
made to define good faith and fair dealing in RUPA, yet it is statuto-
rily decreed to apply to everything involved in the partnership rela-
tionship.
The second sentence of section 404(a) doubtless was designed to ad-
dress the above concerns. It states that: "[t]he duty [of good faith and
fair dealing] may not be eliminated by agreement, but the parties by
agreement may identify specific conduct that does not violate the duty
if the conduct is not manifestly unreasonable."' 1 This allows the part-
ners to define good faith for themselves within certain limits. This
may strike the necessary balance between freedom of contract and the
refusal of the statute to tolerate bad faith among partners. But ques-
tions remain. For example, it is unclear to what the word "conduct"
122. This Article suggested one way to define the concept of good faith when dealing with
the discrete topic of expulsion clauses, see supra text accompanying notes 108-09, but the stan-
dards proposed there have little relevance to the many other questions that can arise when good
faith is applied to partnership dealings that do not involve evaluation and payment of a partner's
interest.
123. Weidner, Midstream, supra note 4, at 854.
124. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1983), where good faith is defined as "honesty in fact in the con-
duct or transaction concerned." The standard of honesty in fact seems too narrow for the vari-
ety of situations which the definition in § 404(a) would encompass. In the case of a merchant,
the code defines good faith as: "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade." U.C.C. § 2-103(I)(b) (1983). A similar definition exists in
§§ 2A-103(3) and 3-103(4). Perhaps this broader definition is what Dean Weidner had in mind.
See supra note 123. But it refers to "commercial standards ... in the trade," a point of refer-
ence that may not provide much guidance in the amorphous matter of relationships and dealings
among partners.
125. See supra note 110.
R UPA
refers. Would it include the conduct specified in the Holman case? 126
Also, the second sentence to section 404(a) qualifies its limitation by a
"manifestly unreasonable" standard. What does this mean? Who de-
cides this issue? And when does it apply? Would it apply at the time
the clause in Holman was drafted? Or at the time it was invoked to
expel the Holman brothers?
The "manifestly unreasonable" standard invites judicial scrutiny of
contract terms without the protective barriers that exist in most juris-
dictions to insulate contracting parties from overly intrusive judicial
interference with contracts. The doctrine of unconscionability, which
also invites judicial scrutiny of the fairness of contract terms, ordinar-
ily limits such inquiries to circumstances where it first is proven that
the bargaining process was flawed in some way. 27 An illustration is
where the complaining party was unfairly surprised by the term being
challenged.' The same limitation exists for other doctrines, such as
duress, undue influence, and fraud, which are used in attacking an
unfair contract. Each involves a serious failure in the bargaining proc-
ess itself. Yet this limitation on judicial review is overcome in RUPA
by force of statutory language. Judges are invited to scrutinize terms
of the partnership contract without regard to the bargaining process
by which those terms were reached. The power this appears to grant
to courts to act as "roving commissions"' 29 searching out injustice is
worrisome. The decision to make good faith a mandatory duty under
the terms proposed for RUPA should be carefully debated before it is
promulgated in a uniform act. 30
126. See supra text accompanying note 73.
127. See Arthur Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. Rmv. 485 (1967) (suggesting a distinction between "procedural" and "substantive" un-
conscionability, with the procedural element involving unfairness in the bargaining process, such
as a hidden or deliberately obscure term).
128. See U.C.C. § 2-302 Comment a (1983), stating: "The principle is one of the prevention
of oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of supe-
rior bargaining power."
129. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & EcoN.
293, 294 (1975).
130. See Larry E. Ribstein, A Mid-Term Assessment of the Project to Revise the Uniform
Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAw. 111, 137-38 (1990) (arguing that the provision for a nonwaivable
duty of good faith and fair dealing is "a questionable provision because it introduces new and
troubling uncertainty"). Ribstein further states that "the good faith duty is an open invitation to
litigate even the most specific agreements." Id. at 138. See also Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms
and Their Partners: The Law and Ethics of Grabbing and Leaving, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1, 43 (1988)
("Applying a good faith analysis not only to the dissolving partner's adherence to the rules of
dissolution and winding up but also to the decision to dissolve adds unnecessary complications
and uncertainties to partnership dissolutions.").
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B. The Exclusivity of Section 404
Another question that can be raised about section 404 relates to the
language in its first paragraph that the "only" fiduciary duties are the
ones specified therein. This appears to preclude the recognition of
other interests and other ways to articulate interests that could de-
velop in the law and that may usefully be considered part of a part-
ner's fiduciary duties. 131 Why was this done? 132
The Reporter suggests the possible source of this odd limitation on
the definition of fiduciary duties. Apparently at an early stage of the
drafting process the word "fiduciary" was objected to, on the ground
that "[i]t is subject to abuse in the hands of judges, academics and
others whose flow of satisfactions is derived in far too large a part
from imposing their personal values on the more productive members
of society. 11 3  That may be true in rare instances, but the explanation
contains a paradox. Abuse of the word "fiduciary" is limited3 4 com-
pared to the more widespread abusive use of the phrase "good
faith,' ' 35 yet, while limiting the scope of fiduciary duties, the Draft
aggressively expands the scope and impact of the duty of good
faith. 3 6
131. One fiduciary duty that is frequently accorded separate status is the duty of disclosure.
See Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348 (Me. 1988); Band v. Livonia Assoc., 439 N.W.2d 285
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989). These cases treat affirmative disclosure as a separate fiduciary duty.
RUPA, on the other hand, while identifying the duty to disclose on demand in § 403(c) (which
deals with the rights of the partners to obtain information), merely mentions an affirmative duty
of disclosure in the Comment to § 404, describing it as a component to the duty of good faith
and fair dealing. It may be that the affirmative duty of disclosure is sufficiently important that it
should be accorded separate status within the language of § 404, or at least not be foreclosed
from such status. This may be of particular importance in those jurisdictions that refuse to print
the Comments to uniform acts in their statutes.
132. In raising this question the author wishes to emphasize that the recognition of fiduciary
duties and the freedom of contract to tailor or override fiduciary duties are two separate issues.
Thus, the argument made above that the duty of good faith should be subject to the same free-
dom of contract as the duty of loyalty is independent of the argument that courts should be free
to define and expand fiduciary duties under the many circumstances that will exist where the
parties have not addressed the matter in their partnership agreement.
133. Weidner, Midstream, supra note 4, at 849.
134. But there are instances where courts have stretched to define relations as fiduciary in
nature under debatable circumstances. See Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc. v. Hessen, 29 B.R. 139
(E.D.N.Y. 1983); Credit Managers Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal. App. 3d 352, 124 Cal. Rptr.
242 (1975) (classifying creditors as fiduciaries).
135. See supra note 117.
136. An additional question about § 404, unrelated to the above discussion, is whether the
Draft defines the duty of care among partners too narrowly by limiting violations of it to gross
negligence. According to one recent article, by doing so the Draft displaces a system of common
law that is operating effectively. See Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., Duty of Care: The Partnership
Cases, 15 OKLA. Crrv U. L. REv. 753 (1990) (for a comprehensive treatment of the duty of care
issue, arguing against drafting a grossly negligent standard). Despite this, the Draft for the first
time includes a standard protecting partners from claims by fellow partners based on ordinary
negligence. See § 404(d) of the Draft, supra note 110.
RUPA
V. CONCLUSION
The latest Draft of RUPA is innovative and comprehensive.'3 7 It is
a welcome addition to the literature of partnership. The Reporter has
written three intelligent, straightforward, thoughtful articles explain-
ing what he has done and why. All of this is highly desirable, but the
exposure of the Draft to professionals interested in the law of partner-
ship has been quite limited. No urgency exists. The second and final
reading of RUPA should not be completed and the vote of the Con-
ference should not be taken until others have had the chance to com-
ment on an exposure draft. RUPA is too important a piece of
legislation to be acted upon before that has taken place.
137. The Draft makes a number of constructive and positive changes to UPA. Chief among
them is a carefully crafted shift to the entity theory. One laudable consequence of this is that the
problems posed by cases like Fairway Development Co. v. Title Insurance Co., 621 F. Supp. 120
(N.D. Ohio 1985), where the automatic dissolution of a partnership creates havoc in an execu-
tory contract setting in the hands of a court that is not sensitive to the policies involved, will no
longer plague the law of partnership.
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